RV & Boat Storage · Secondary Market · SBA 7(a) · 2026

    SBA 7(a) RV & Boat Storage Acquisition & Reposition Feasibility Study

    SBA 7(a) acquisition of an underperforming open-lot facility repositioned with covered and enclosed spaces, market rates, and ancillary services: T-12 verification and the value-add lift.


    Engagement Snapshot

    MarketSecondary market, recreation-adjacent
    Asset typeExisting open-lot RV and boat storage, value-add acquisition and reposition, owner-operated
    ProgramSBA 7(a) change-of-ownership, multipurpose property
    Project scaleAdd covered and enclosed spaces, raise rates, add ancillary services
    Total project basisAcquisition plus repositioning capital plus working capital (representative)
    Study scopeT-12 verification, reposition lift modeling, comparables, DSCR and debt yield, IRR, risk assessment
    Standard of preparationPrepared under USPAP discipline and aligned with SBA SOP 50 10 8

    Representative engagement profile. Project parameters are illustrative of this market. Market figures reflect current third-party data and are sourced in the exhibit below.

    The question put to the analysis

    A buyer proposed to acquire an underperforming older open-lot RV and boat storage facility in a secondary market, financed through an SBA 7(a) loan, and to reposition it. The facility was running at roughly 70 percent occupancy with rates below the local market, absentee management with no professional systems, no ancillary revenue, and a gravel surface, all open uncovered spaces. The thesis was a value-add thesis: a sound facility in a real market was underearning because it was under-priced, under-occupied, under-amenitized, and unprofessionally run, and bringing it to market practice while adding covered and enclosed product would lift both revenue and value. The lender needed an independent assessment of two things that distinguish an acquisition from a ground-up build.

    The first is verification. The facility has an operating history, and both the purchase price and the reposition case rest on what it actually earns today, which must be verified against a trailing-twelve-month rent roll reconciled to the seller's tax records rather than taken from the seller's summary. The second is the lift. The reposition projects materially higher revenue from several specific levers, and its credibility depends on whether each can realistically deliver in this market. This engagement profile illustrates how a feasibility study verifies an RV and boat storage facility's in-place performance, models the reposition lift lever by lever, and tests a value-add storage credit on coverage and return.

    Verifying the in-place performance

    The diligence task that defines an acquisition is verifying what the facility actually earns, and the analysis reconciled the trailing-twelve-month rent roll against the seller's tax records and confirmed the change-of-ownership safeguards.

    In-place verificationFigure
    Formatall open uncovered lot, gravel
    Verified occupancy~70%
    Verified ratesbelow local market
    Managementabsentee, no professional systems
    Ancillary revenuenone
    In-place NOIdepressed by vacancy and soft rates

    The verification grounded the deal in real numbers. The in-place occupancy and rates were confirmed against the rent roll and validated against the seller's tax transcripts rather than accepted from the seller's summary, and the analysis confirmed the anti-flip safeguards, since a facility transferred within the prior three years triggers additional appraisal and review requirements. The depressed in-place net operating income, a function of the vacancy, the below-market rates, and the absence of any ancillary revenue, was itself diagnostic: it confirmed the underperformance was operational and presentational rather than a problem with the location or the asset, which is the cleanest form of a value-add thesis and what made the upside real.

    The reposition thesis and the lift

    The reposition projected higher revenue from several specific levers, and the analysis modeled each rather than applying a single growth rate.

    Reposition leverAt acquisitionPost-reposition (modeled)
    Formatall open lotadd covered canopy and enclosed spaces
    Ratesbelow marketto market, plus on turnover
    Occupancy~70%~90%+
    Managementabsenteeprofessional, automated software
    Ancillarynonewash bay, dump station, electric
    Expense ratioinefficientnormalized to ~35%

    The lift came from several compounding levers grounded in real operator experience. Rates were brought to market, executed in the disciplined way successful storage repositions work, a meaningful increase across the existing base where the gap to market was largest, then a further step on each turnover, an approach that documented repositions have achieved with little vacancy loss and even waitlists where the undersupply was real. New covered and enclosed product was added, introducing premium price points the all-open facility never offered and broadening the addressable demand. Professional, automated management replaced the absentee operation, lifting occupancy toward 90 percent and bringing the expense ratio down to a normalized 35 percent, and ancillary services were added. The analysis modeled the reposition period explicitly, because the rate, occupancy, and construction gains arrive over time rather than at once.

    Modeling the lift and the value creation

    The financial model traced the facility from its verified condition to its repositioned stabilized condition.

    MeasureIn-placePost-reposition (stabilized)
    Formatopen onlyopen plus covered plus enclosed
    Occupancy~70%~90%+
    Ratesbelow marketat market, premium for covered and enclosed
    Expense ratioinefficient~35%
    NOIdepressedmaterially higher
    Value driverlow NOI, Class Bhigher NOI plus cap-rate compression to Class A

    The reposition produced a step change, and the table makes the source explicit. Revenue rose because rate, occupancy, format mix, and ancillary income all contributed, and the net operating income rose further because professionalizing the operation brought the expense ratio down from the inefficient absentee structure. The value creation came from two compounding sources: the higher net operating income, and a cap-rate compression as the asset moved from a tired Class B open lot toward a Class A facility that institutional and private buyers price more keenly. The analysis treated that value creation as contingent on execution rather than as a given, since the lift exists only if the rate program holds, the new product leases, and the occupancy gain materializes, and it noted that because storage value is overwhelmingly real estate with minimal goodwill, no going-concern business appraisal was triggered, unlike a hotel or gas station reposition.

    Comparables and coverage

    The analysis benchmarked the outcome and tested the credit.

    Comparable basisBenchmarkBearing on the analysis
    Acquisition: Class B open-lot basisgoing-in on depressed NOIFrames the purchase price
    Stabilized: Class A cap rate~mid-5% to low-6%Frames the repositioned value
    Operating: NOI margin (professionalized)~63% to 65%Supports the normalized expense ratio
    Operating: covered and enclosed premiummeaningful over open lotSupports the new price points
    MetricIn-placePost-reposition (stabilized)Downside (slower rate realization, softer occupancy, capex overrun)
    NOIdepressedmaterially higherbetween
    DSCRthin~1.20x to 1.25xthinner
    Debt yieldlow~8% to 10%lower
    Levered IRR—basecompressed downside

    The stabilized coverage reached the 1.20 to 1.25 times the lender required, supported by the recovered occupancy, the market rates, and the new premium product, with a debt yield in the 8 to 10 percent range. The base-case levered return reflected the value-add profile, driven by the net operating income lift and the cap-rate compression as the asset de-risked. The downside case, modeling a slower rate realization, softer occupancy, and a capital overrun on the new covered and enclosed buildings, compressed the coverage and the return. The 7(a) program fit the deal because it could fund the acquisition, the repositioning capital, and the post-closing working capital in a single instrument, and the analysis noted that a standby seller note could count toward the equity injection.

    Where the risk concentrates

    The risks in an RV and boat storage reposition are specific and the analysis addressed each. Execution of the rate program is a foremost risk, because much of the lift depends on bringing rates to market without driving tenants away, addressed by modeling the disciplined increase-then-turnover approach that real repositions use and a downside where realization is slower. Construction and lease-up of the new covered and enclosed product is the related risk, since the premium price points depend on the new buildings actually leasing, stress-tested in the downside. Verification risk attends every acquisition, and the analysis reconciled the rent roll to tax records and confirmed the anti-flip safeguards before relying on the figures.

    Oversupply is a market risk, since new supply could compress rates and slow the occupancy gain, addressed by checking the local pipeline. Seasonality affects the boat portion in colder climates. Recession and discretionary-spend sensitivity is a sector risk, mitigated by long tenure and low delinquency. Expense inflation, particularly property-tax reassessment on the sale and insurance, is a margin risk built into the expense ratio, with environmental and site due diligence handled as separate borrower-obtained scopes.

    Conclusion

    The engagement reached a conditional affirmative, with the conditions tied to the value-add structure. The in-place occupancy and rates were verified against the rent roll and tax records rather than accepted, and the depressed net operating income confirmed the underperformance was operational and presentational, which is what made the upside real. The reposition lift was modeled lever by lever, the rate program, the new covered and enclosed product, the occupancy recovery, and the ancillary additions, each grounded in how real repositions perform rather than asserted, with the reposition period modeled explicitly. The base and downside cases bracketed the outcome, showing a strong return if the levers deliver and a thinner result if rate realization or lease-up disappoints.

    The value of the feasibility study in a storage reposition is to verify what the facility earns today and to test whether the projected lift is credible lever by lever against the market. By reconciling the rent roll to tax records, by grounding the rate and format lift in demonstrated reposition experience, and by presenting coverage and return across a base and downside case with the reposition period modeled explicitly, the analysis gave the lender a clear view of the gap between what the facility is and what the reposition claims it will become.

    Market Data Exhibit

    MetricValueNote / Source
    Format at acquisitionall open uncovered lot, gravelRepresentative
    Verified in-place occupancy~70%Verified, representative
    Verified ratesbelow local marketVerified, representative
    Post-reposition formatopen plus covered plus enclosedRepresentative
    Post-reposition occupancy~90%+Modeled
    Post-reposition expense ratio~35%Industry
    NOI margin (stabilized)~63% to 65%Industry
    Class A cap rate~mid-5% to low-6%Near self-storage
    Going-concern appraisalnot triggered (goodwill minimal)SBA SOP 50 10 8
    SBA 7(a) leverageup to 90% acquisitionSBA 7(a)
    Stabilized DSCR / debt yield~1.20x to 1.25x / ~8% to 10%Representative

    Pro forma figures are representative of this market. Industry benchmarks are indicative; verify current occupancy, rates, format premiums, cap rates, anti-flip requirements, and SBA program parameters before citation in a client deliverable.

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