Can Rural Retail Be Profitable? A Feasibility Framework

# Can Rural Retail Be Profitable? A Feasibility Framework

For the regulation itself, section by section, see our 7 CFR Part 5001 Handbook.

Why retail economics change in low-density markets

Rural (or more precisely, low-density) retail is not "urban retail with fewer customers." It is a structurally different economic system where the same store format can swing from attractive to unviable because two forces move in opposite directions: (1) demand dispersion stretches the trade area and weakens routine footfall, while (2) supply-side fixed costs (labor coverage, refrigeration, compliance, inventory, logistics) often do not scale down linearly. A practical way to summarize the difference comes from classic location economics: each product category has a threshold (minimum market size needed for viability) and a range (how far customers will travel). In low-density markets the threshold is harder to reach, and viability depends on either increasing "range" (customers drive farther), increasing basket size, or reducing the store's fixed-cost "breakpoint." [1]

Even in a highly motorized economy, most people still prefer not to travel far for frequent needs; low density simply forces them to do so more often and with fewer alternatives. In the United States, the U.S. Census Bureau reports that "urban areas" account for 80.0% of the population under the post-2020 definition (which also raised the minimum population threshold for urban qualification from 2,500 to 5,000). [2] This matters because a retail concept designed around dense neighborhoods is implicitly designed around a very different travel, competition, and frequency environment than the one implied by that remaining share.

Distance data illustrates the "choice compression" low-density markets create. Researchers at the Economic Research Service, part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, found that in 2015 the median distance to the nearest large food store was 0.9 miles for the overall U.S. population, but 3.1 miles in rural areas; the median distance to the third-nearest store (a proxy for competitive choice) was 1.7 miles overall versus 6.1 miles in rural areas. [3] For rural retail feasibility, this single fact has two outsized implications: customers can be "capturable" from a larger radius, but they also become more price-aware and trip-bundling-oriented because each trip is costly.

On the cost side, low density is a known enemy of distribution efficiency. The entity United States Postal Service Office of Inspector General explicitly frames "Low Density" delivery as operationally challenging because delivery points are far apart and because the separation between mailbox and door can materially reduce efficiency; it notes that in both high- and low-density contexts, door deliveries can decrease efficiency and potentially increase cost. [4] Academic reviews of last-mile delivery similarly emphasize that low consumer density increases delivery cost, and that higher rural costs can change which delivery models make sense. [5] This logistics reality shows up in store economics as well: inbound freight, stockout risk, and "safety inventory" requirements often rise as service frequency and route density fall.

Finally, the sector mix itself is shifting under these constraints. A USDA synthesis of the rural food-retail landscape (1990–2015) shows a pattern that is economically intuitive for low-density trade areas: traditional grocery stores decline while other formats rise. The share of grocery stores declined in rural nonmetro counties; dollar stores and supercenters increased steadily; and the percentage of rural nonmetro counties with fewer than 8 food retailers per 10,000 people increased (with per-capita retailer counts falling). [6] This is not just a "food access" story—it is also a profitability story, because formats that can survive with lower density tend to expand, and those that cannot tend to contract.

# A practical definition of "rural-retail profitability"

Rural retail profitability is best evaluated at store-level unit economics rather than at the level of "community need." Which categories thrive depends on whether a store can consistently clear three hurdles:

First is the gross margin hurdle: gross profit dollars must cover labor, occupancy, utilities, shrink, and admin after accounting for higher logistics friction. This is why "what you sell" matters more in rural than in urban contexts: a low-density store typically cannot rely on high transaction counts to compensate for thin margins.

Second is the frequency hurdle: low density means fewer people passing the door each day, so viable models either sell high-frequency needs (so local residents return often) or capture externally generated traffic (highways, commuters, tourism, work sites). Industry data from the entity National Association of Convenience Stores underscores how critical frequency-plus-margin combinations are: foodservice and beverages have become outsized profit engines inside convenience stores, not niche add-ons. [7]

Third is the coverage hurdle: a rural store may be the only nearby provider, but it must still staff enough hours to be relevant to customers' schedules. That creates a minimum labor requirement (manager coverage, cashier coverage, compliance tasks) that can be punishing if volume is inconsistent or seasonal—an issue that appears repeatedly in rural pharmacy and grocery discussions. [8]

A key implication: rural retail can be profitable, but the winning formula usually looks like trip consolidation + margin stacking + operating simplicity, not "a smaller version of a city store." That pattern is visible across sectors and is supported by both research on retail structure changes and by how large rural-oriented chains describe their models in filings. [9]

# Sectors that thrive in low-density areas and the mechanisms behind success

Below is a sector-by-sector view of what tends to work in low-density trade areas, and why—with an explicit focus on the economic mechanisms (threshold, range, margin structure, and operating model) rather than on anecdote.

Fuel-led convenience retail with high-margin food and beverages

In many low-density regions, fuel creates a "gravity point" because it is both high-frequency and hard to substitute without travel. The modern profitability story, however, is not fuel alone—it is fuel as the traffic engine, with inside categories monetizing the trip.

NACS data for 2024 shows that foodservice (prepared food, commissary, dispensed beverages) accounted for 27.7% of in-store sales and 38.6% of in-store gross margin dollars; packaged beverages accounted for 17.9% of in-store sales and 21.2% of gross profit dollars. Combined, foodservice plus packaged beverages represented 60.8% of in-store profit dollars in 2024, and category "synergies" are measurable (for example, more than one-third of packaged-beverage buyers also purchased prepared food in the same trip in the cited dataset). [7]

This margin stack is consistent with how rural-leaning operators describe their economics. entity ["company","Casey's General Stores","midwest convenience retailer"]' fiscal 2025 10-K reports revenue and "revenue less cost of goods sold (excluding depreciation and amortization)" by category. In fiscal 2025, prepared food and dispensed beverage plus grocery and general merchandise ("inside sales") totaled roughly $5.76B of $15.94B revenue, while fuel totaled $9.78B; but inside categories generated about $2.39B of $3.75B of "revenue less cost of goods sold," versus $1.24B from fuel. That implies (by calculation from the published table) inside categories were about 36% of revenue but about 64% of gross profit dollars in that definition—showing how high-margin inside products financially carry the model even when fuel dominates revenue. [10]

A useful caution for feasibility: the fuel + inside strategy is powerful, but it is not "optional." In NACS reporting, a large share of stores become unprofitable if fuel gross profit dollars are removed; one NACS analysis of State of the Industry survey results described that "only about one-third" of surveyed companies would be profitable without fuel gross profit dollars. [11] For a rural feasibility study, this means that (a) fuel volume/value capture or (b) some other traffic anchor must exist—or the store must replace fuel's contribution through unusually strong inside economics.

# Small-box discount general merchandise ("dollar" formats)

Discount general merchandise is one of the clearest "thriving" formats in low-density and small-town environments because it is engineered around a low fixed-cost store box, limited assortment, and high trip frequency for staples.

entity ["company","Dollar General","us discount retailer"] describes its model in its January 31, 2025 10-K as "small-box" stores aimed at providing everyday needs at low prices in convenient locations, with explicit emphasis that the format can "succeed in small markets with limited shopping alternatives." It also reports that stores average roughly 7,500 square feet of selling space and that approximately 80% of stores are located in towns of 20,000 or fewer people—direct evidence of a strategy designed around low-density thresholds. [12]

However, feasibility should separate "thrives as a chain format" from "improves the local retail ecosystem." USDA researchers examining 2000–2019 data found that when a dollar store opened in a census tract, independent grocery retailers were more likely to exit, with notably larger effects in rural tracts: the likelihood of exit in rural tracts was reported as about three times greater than in urban tracts, and rural impacts persisted longer. [13] In other words, dollar formats can be profitable in low density precisely because they can operate at lower thresholds—but they may weaken the viability of higher-service, thinner-margin grocery models in the same trade area.

For investors and planners, the key takeaway is directional: discount general merchandise thrives where (1) convenience is valued, (2) assortments can be simplified, and (3) the community cannot support a full grocery offer at competitive prices. [14]

# Farm, ranch, and rural-lifestyle retail (feed, fencing, animal health, workwear)

Rural-lifestyle retail thrives when it matches two structural conditions:

• Demand is specialized and locally anchored (animals, fencing, maintenance), and
• products are bulky or urgent enough to resist pure e-commerce substitution (feed, propane, fencing supplies, seasonal equipment). This creates a natural "range extension": customers are willing to drive because the mission is important and alternatives are far away.

entity ["company","Tractor Supply Company","rural lifestyle retailer"]'s 2024 10-K is unusually explicit about this logic. It states that stores are located primarily in towns outlying major metropolitan markets and in rural communities, and it frames the company as a "trip consolidator" for rural customers' maintenance requirements. It also describes an omnichannel overlay—expanded online assortment, buy-online/pickup-in-store, ship-to-store, curbside pickup, and store delivery—positioning digital not as a replacement for rural stores but as a way to extend assortment without adding physical footprint. [15]

At the local-business level (co-ops and independents), farm supply can also be structurally healthier than conventional groceries because gross margins can be materially higher. A USDA Rural Development analysis of income statements for local farm supply and marketing cooperatives reported gross margins averaging 17.1% for farm supply cooperatives (versus 8.2% across included cooperatives), and noted that small cooperatives "most often selling farm supplies" had the highest gross margin by cooperative size (10.8%). [16]

The feasibility mechanism here is straightforward: a higher gross margin base plus mission-critical replenishment cycles makes it easier for low-density retail to cover fixed labor and facility costs. [17]

# Hardware, building materials, and "fix-it-now" retail

Hardware and building materials can work in low-density regions because they combine (a) urgency ("I need it today"), (b) bulky items (expensive to ship and inconvenient to return), and (c) strong attachment to local project cycles (storms, planting season, maintenance). The weak point is procurement disadvantage: independents can be out-bought by big-box competitors.

That is where cooperative supply models become a profitability lever. USDA's cooperative guidance notes that cooperatively owned hardware wholesalers supply virtually all independent hardware stores in the U.S., and that independents rely on such cooperatives for products, promotions, and education services to remain viable against chains. [18] Those supply-side economies substitute for the density advantage large chains typically have.

The implication for a rural retail feasibility framework is that viability in this sector depends less on "local enthusiasm" and more on whether the store can access a purchasing and logistics backbone (co-op membership, regional distributor terms, or a multi-store group). [18]

# Full-line groceries and fresh food retail

Groceries are the most frequently demanded retail category and the most socially essential—but economically, they are often the most fragile in low-density markets because the model carries high fixed costs (refrigeration, shrink management, labor for perishables) and usually competes against larger, more efficient operators within driving distance.

The structural pressure is visible in national-scale data: USDA's rural food retail summary shows that grocery stores declined in nonmetro counties from 1990 to 2015 while convenience stores, dollar stores, and supercenters increased; the median number of grocery stores per capita declined by 40% for rural and urban nonmetro counties; and the share of rural nonmetro counties with no food retailers increased over the period covered in the summary. [19]

Competition effects appear especially acute when a low-threshold competitor enters. USDA analysis of 2000–2019 data concluded that dollar store entry increased the likelihood of independent grocery exit and reduced employment and sales, with the rural effect meaningfully larger and more persistent than the urban effect. [13]

That said, grocery can still be viable in low density, but typically only under one of four operating logics:

1. A niche demand anchor (e.g., natural/organic niche, tourism-season niche, or culturally specific niche) that increases willingness to travel and can support premium margins. [1]
2. A hybrid store that bundles groceries with higher-margin complements (deli/foodservice, flowers, gifts, hardware corner, fuel), effectively becoming a trip consolidator rather than a pure grocer. [20]
3. A community-backed ownership/finance model that substitutes civic capital for missing commercial density. In a rural food co-op case-study report, the authors identify member support and financing as critical: for example, one co-op case reported that over 80% of sales went to members in 2003 and that members provided over $300,000 in loans and equity to support expansion. [21]
4. A community ownership/operation model in which local actors fund facilities and sometimes manage the store when private operators cannot justify the economics. A study of villages in entity ["country","Denmark","country in europe"] (led by authors at the entity ["organization","University of Copenhagen","copenhagen university"]) describes 18 cases where communities collected funds to purchase and renovate premises; in smaller villages, communities sometimes had to take on management themselves because "low rent is not enough to attract storekeepers." [22]

Public and hybrid models sit in the same conceptual bucket: they prioritize access and community development, but require a feasibility test that explicitly includes governance capacity and the ongoing subsidy question. A policy-focused "public grocery stores" guide emphasizes that "one-size-fits-all" solutions do not exist and compares multiple public and nonprofit models through case studies. [23]

# Pharmacies and health-adjacent retail

Pharmacy retail is a special case: the demand is non-discretionary, but profitability is heavily shaped by reimbursement and payer-network dynamics rather than by local willingness to pay. That makes "thriving" uneven across geographies and time.

A rural pharmacy policy brief by the entity ["organization","Rural Policy Research Institute","rural health policy center"] highlights structural pressures reported by rural independent owners, including low reimbursement rates, payment delays, competition from mail-order services, and Medicare Part D network exclusions. [24] A large cross-sectional study of U.S. community pharmacies published in 2025 found high turnover over a 14-year period, with an overall annualized turnover rate reported around 6.2% and differing net change patterns across chain versus independent/franchise categories. [25]

From a feasibility perspective, pharmacy viability in low density often depends on whether the store can (a) diversify into reimbursable clinical services, (b) attach to a broader retail basket (front-end retail, gifts, OTC), or (c) secure supportive contracting dynamics. The key point is methodological: a rural pharmacy feasibility model must include payer mix and reimbursement risk as core drivers—not just trade-area demographics. [26]

# Parcel pickup points, lockers, and "service retail" as traffic generators

In low-density contexts, "retail" profitability increasingly involves selling services or becoming a node in other networks (parcel pickup, returns, bill pay, money transfer). The logic is that services can create incremental trips and monetize unused labor capacity.

But density matters here too. The U.S. Postal Service OIG notes that centralized delivery (including parcel lockers) can reduce door-delivery cost by reducing detours and walking time—an efficiency reason for lockers. [4] At the same time, literature reviews on parcel lockers caution that sparse areas can face underutilization and even increased vehicle miles depending on network design and customer travel requirements. [27]

For a rural retailer, the feasibility question becomes practical: does acting as a pickup/locker node (or returns point) create enough footfall and attachment sales to offset space, security, and operational complexity? The evidence supports the principle (centralization can be more efficient than door delivery), but the local business case is highly contingent. [28]

# The unit-economics logic that explains why these sectors win

A feasibility framework is most reliable when it expresses rural retail viability in a small set of drivers that can be measured and stress-tested.

# Demand can be modeled as "spend × capture," but rural requires explicit trade-area thinking

Rural retail feasibility usually starts with trade-area demand: households in a drive-time radius, their purchasing power, and the portion of spending that can be captured locally. University extension guidance on evaluating retail and service opportunities explicitly frames the quantitative workflow as: assess demand, inventory supply, then draw realistic conclusions, using tools including population-threshold methods and surplus/leakage methods (gap analysis, pull factors). [20]

The concept of "leakage" is particularly important in small towns because spending routinely flows outward ("outshopping"). entity ["organization","Oklahoma State University Extension","osu extension service"] defines retail leakage as occurring when actual spending is less than expected spending—implying sales that could occur locally are not occurring locally—and positions pull factor / sales gap methods as a way to identify which sectors are losing capture and which are attracting outside shoppers. [29]

In low-density markets, this leakage lens changes the opportunity set:

• A town can be "too small" for a full-service grocer yet still have significant leakage in select subcategories (pharmacy OTC, pet food, hardware basics, prepared meals). [30]
• Conversely, certain categories can show surplus because the store captures non-local traffic (highway-exit convenience, worksite corridors, tourist lakes). This is why purely resident-based population counts can underestimate viable demand for the right formats. [31]

# Profitability is "gross profit dollars per week" versus a fixed coverage cost

A rural store usually fails for one of two accounting reasons:

• It cannot generate enough gross profit dollars to cover fixed costs at normal service hours.
• Or it generates adequate gross profit, but operational complexity (labor, shrink, spoilage, logistics) erodes it.

Winning sectors tend to win because they either (a) generate high gross profit dollars per trip (prepared food, convenience beverage, specialty farm supply) or (b) achieve operating simplicity at low fixed cost (small-box discount). [32]

The margin stack in convenience retail is a concrete example. NACS shows that foodservice and packaged beverages together account for a majority of in-store profit dollars. [33] Casey's filings show a similar pattern at company level: in fiscal 2025, inside categories produced roughly $2.39B of $3.75B in "revenue less cost of goods sold" while fuel produced $1.24B, even though fuel was the larger revenue line. [10] This is exactly the kind of "margin stacking" rural feasibility should test: whether the store has at least one high-margin engine that scales with trips.

Logistics friction is not a side issue—it is part of the P&L

Low density raises the effective cost of the "last mile" and of store replenishment because route density is low and detours are expensive. USPS OIG describes rural delivery as involving long driving distances between delivery points and sometimes long walks from vehicle to door, and it explicitly notes that door deliveries can reduce efficiency and increase cost. [4] Broader last-mile research likewise points to low consumer density as a cost driver, often making alternative delivery models more attractive than pure door delivery. [34]

For brick-and-mortar rural stores, this implies three feasibility checks that are often underweighted:

• Inbound freight economics: minimum drop sizes, delivery frequency, and the cost of stockouts. [35]
• Inventory strategy: whether the store must hold "buffer" inventory because replenishment is slow or unreliable (raising working capital and shrink exposure). [35]
• Category selection: whether the store is anchored in categories where immediacy and bulk offset e-commerce substitution (feed, fencing, repair parts). [36]

# Feasibility framework for rural retail

A feasibility framework should be explicit enough that multiple analysts can execute it independently and obtain similar conclusions, and flexible enough to fit different sectors (fuel/convenience, hardware, farm supply, grocery hybrids). The following framework is built from established trade-area evaluation methods used in extension guidance and from empirically observed rural format economics.

# Define the trade area in time, not in miles

Use drive time as the core unit because rural road networks and weather can make "as-the-crow-flies" misleading. Evidence on rural store access suggests that rural households already travel farther for essentials than the overall population, and that competitive choice is thinner (third-nearest store much farther). [3]

Practically, this step should output: (a) primary and secondary drive-time rings, (b) estimates of households and day-population within each ring, and (c) a segmentation of demand into residents, commuters, and transient traffic (if applicable). The point is to pick a trade-area definition consistent with the product's likely "range," as formalized in location economics. [37]

# Quantify demand using at least two methods

Because any single demand method can mislead in low-density settings, triangulate.

Method one: population-threshold logic (how many households with what purchasing power are needed for the concept to clear fixed costs). Extension guidance explicitly describes business mix analysis as a population-threshold method. [20]

Method two: surplus/leakage logic (how much spending currently leaks out of the trade area and could plausibly be recaptured). OSU Extension's pull factor and sales gap approach operationalizes this by comparing actual per-capita retail activity to expected levels and interpreting values below 1.0 as leakage. [29]

Your output should be a bounded range: conservative demand, base demand, upside demand—each tied to a capture-rate assumption you can defend from observed competition and travel patterns. [30]

# Map competition as a function of "choice depth," not just store counts

In low-density markets, competition is often less about the nearest competitor and more about the next best alternative that shoppers can combine into a larger trip ("I'll just pick it up when I go to the big town"). USDA's use of the "third-nearest store" distance explicitly operationalizes this idea by treating it as a proxy for consumer choice and competition intensity. [3]

For feasibility, include: (a) distance/time to nearest and next alternatives by category, (b) any "gravity" competitor (supercenter, discount), and (c) whether new entrants (like dollar stores) have documented impacts on incumbents in similar contexts. [38]

# Choose a format that is mechanically compatible with low density

This is where rural feasibility differs most from "generic" retail feasibility. The store format should be selected explicitly to reduce the threshold and expand the workable range. The sector evidence suggests a few format archetypes:

• Traffic-anchor + margin-stacker (fuel + prepared food + beverages), consistent with NACS profit composition and with the inside-margin contribution shown in convenience retailer filings. [39]
• Low fixed-cost small-box (discount general merchandise), as described in Dollar General's emphasis on low-cost operation and success in small markets with limited alternatives. [12]
• Trip consolidator for specialized rural needs (farm/ranch/hardware), matching the "trip consolidation" framing in Tractor Supply's 10-K and the purchasing-scale advantage described for hardware cooperatives. [40]
• Hybrid/community-supported models (grocery), which become relevant when private economics are insufficient but the community funds/operates to maintain access. [41]

# Build a "truth table" P&L tied to operational realities

Instead of a single-point forecast, build a scenario table where each scenario is defined by operational drivers:

• Trips per day (or per week)
• Average basket
• Gross margin by major categories
• Labor coverage model (hours open × staff mix)
• Shrink/spoilage assumptions
• Inbound freight cost and delivery frequency

The goal is to locate the break-even "ridge" and understand sensitivity to each driver. NACS data provides a strong rationale for modeling category margin stacks in convenience retail (foodservice/beverage profit concentration). [7] For farm supply and hardware, incorporate higher gross-margin potential and procurement structure where applicable. [42] For groceries and pharmacies, explicitly model the reimbursement/spoilage and labor complexity issues documented in the literature and policy briefs. [43]

# Stress-test with "structural threats," not just generic downside

The downside case in rural retail is often structural rather than cyclical:

• A new low-threshold entrant can alter the market equilibrium (e.g., documented dollar-store impacts on rural independent grocers). [38]
• A distribution change can materially raise service costs (low-density delivery economics and the cost of door delivery are a known issue even for national carriers). [44]
• Reimbursement rule changes or payer-network shifts can break pharmacy economics (as described in rural pharmacy policy analysis). [26]

Your feasibility conclusion should therefore be a decision with explicit conditions—e.g., "viable if we secure procurement terms X and a foodservice attach rate within Y–Z," rather than a single EBITDA number.

# Failure modes and how to de-risk a rural retail investment

Rural retail failure patterns are unusually consistent across geographies because they reflect the same underlying constraint: insufficient density to cover fixed costs without a compensating advantage.

A common failure mode is attempting a full-service grocery model without a defensible advantage (price, freshness, niche, community financing). National-scale data show grocery contraction in nonmetro areas over long periods, and research shows that dollar-store entry can further increase independent grocer exit risk in rural tracts. [45] De-risking here means one of the four logics described earlier: hybridization, niche anchoring, community-backed financing/operations, or a supply-chain innovation that materially reduces spoilage and labor intensity. [46]

A second failure mode is ignoring procurement and logistics structure in categories where national chains win on cost. The cooperative hardware model illustrates a proven method of reducing that disadvantage by pooling purchasing, promotions, and education services. [18] For feasibility, the presence (or absence) of a procurement backbone is not a detail—it can be the difference between sustainable gross margin and permanent price uncompetitiveness.

A third failure mode is overestimating digital substitution as a universal fix. Digital can expand assortment and reduce the need for selling-space expansion, as Tractor Supply describes through online assortment and pickup programs, but low density still imposes real distribution costs and customer travel burdens that can make certain delivery models inefficient. [47] A de-risked approach is typically "omnichannel for assortment + store for immediacy," not "online replaces the store."

A fourth failure mode is treating regulated health-adjacent retail as if it were ordinary retail. Rural independent pharmacy sustainability is tightly linked to reimbursement, payment lags, and network dynamics—factors that can overwhelm local demand strength. [26] A feasibility model that does not explicitly include payer mix, reimbursement rates, and service reimbursement pathways is structurally incomplete.

The overarching de-risking principle is therefore operational: in low-density areas, you do not "win" by being marginally better at urban retail. You win by designing a model that explicitly reduces threshold, expands workable range, and stacks high-margin reasons to visit—and by validating those mechanics with trade-area demand methods (threshold + leakage), competitive choice depth, and a scenario-based unit economics model. [48]

[1] [37] [48] Central-place theory | Urban Planning, Geography & ...

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[2] Nation's Urban and Rural Populations Shift Following 2020 Census

https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/urban-rural-populations.html

[3] U.S. Shoppers' Access to Multiple Food Stores Varies by Region | Economic Research Service

https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2019/june/u-s-shoppers-access-to-multiple-food-stores-varies-by-region

[4] [28] [35] [44] Package Delivery in Rural and Dense Urban Areas. Report Number RISC-WP-20-008.

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[5] [34] Last-Mile Delivery Methods in E-Commerce

https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/24/16437

[6] [19] The Food Retail Landscape Across Rural America

https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/publications/101356/EIB-223_Summary.pdf

[7] [33] C-Store Foodservice Delivered Exceptional Growth in 2024 | NACS

https://www.convenience.org/Media/Press-Releases/2025-Press-Releases/C-Store-Foodservice-Delivered-Exceptional-Growth-i

[8] [24] [26] Rural Policy Research Institute - Independent Pharmacy Closures

https://rupri.public-health.uiowa.edu/publications/policybriefs/2022/Independent%20Pharmacy%20Closures.pdf

[10] Casey's General Stores Fiscal 2025 10-K

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/726958/000072695825000065/casy-20250430.htm

[11] Another Record Year for Sales | NACS Magazine

https://www.nacsmagazine.com/Issues/June-2024/Another-Record-Year-for-Sales

[12] Dollar General Corporation January 31, 2025 10-K

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29534/000155837025003413/dg-20250131x10k.htm

[13] [38] [45] Dollar Store Entry Affects Rural Grocery Stores More Than Urban | Economic Research Service

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[15] [40] [47] Tractor Supply Company 2024 10-K

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916365/000091636525000076/tsco-20241228.htm

[16] [42] USDA Rural Development - Local Farm Supply and Marketing Cooperatives

https://www.rd.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rr134.pdf

[18] USDA Cooperative Information Report - Hardware Cooperatives

https://www.rd.usda.gov/files/cir55.pdf

[20] Retail and Service Business Opportunities - University Extension

[21] Keys to Success: Rural Food Coops

[22] Securing Rural Grocery Stores: Communities Matter

[23] Public Grocery Stores

[25] Community Pharmacy Turnover and Context of Openings

[27] Parcel Locker Solutions for Last Mile Delivery: A Systematic Review

[29] Measuring Community Retail Activity - Oklahoma State University Extension

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