SBA 504 Select-Service Hotel Feasibility Study: Sun Belt Ground-Up
Ground-up SBA 504 franchised select-service hotel in a Sun Belt secondary market: competitive-set penetration analysis, a multi-year RevPAR ramp, and base and downside returns.
Engagement Snapshot
Representative engagement profile. Project parameters are illustrative of this market and program. Market figures reflect current third-party data and are sourced in the exhibit below.
The question put to the analysis
A hospitality-experienced sponsor proposed to build a ground-up franchised upper-midscale select-service hotel on an interstate-adjacent parcel in a growing Sun Belt secondary metro, financed through an SBA 504 structure, carrying a national brand flag. The lender needed an independent assessment of whether the market would support a new hotel of roughly 110 keys, how the property would penetrate its competitive set as it ramped, and whether the credit would service its debt through the lease-up and at stabilization.
A hotel is the textbook special-purpose going concern, a hospitality business whose value is inseparable from its flag, its management, and its operation, and the feasibility question reflects that. The revenue is the product of occupancy and average daily rate, expressed as revenue per available room, and a new hotel does not simply earn the market average; it earns a share of the market set by how its product, flag, and location penetrate against the existing competitive supply. A study that applies the market's average revenue per available room to a new property, or that assumes stabilization on opening, misstates the asset. This engagement profile illustrates how a feasibility study segments hotel demand, derives a penetration ramp against a competitive set, builds revenue from occupancy and rate, and tests the credit on coverage, debt yield, and return across a base and downside case.
The market and the competitive set
The analysis began with the competitive set, because in hotel analysis a property's performance is measured as penetration against a defined set of comparable hotels, not against the market in the abstract.
The competitive read defined the opportunity. The set of five upper-midscale and upscale select-service hotels totaled roughly 520 rooms and ran at 70 percent occupancy, a $128 average daily rate, and an $89.60 revenue per available room. The subject was modeled to penetrate above fair share at stabilization, reaching a 114 revenue-per-available-room index, justified by being the newest product in the market, carrying a strong national flag with a large loyalty program, and sitting against four distinct demand generators: a regional medical center, the interstate corridor, a state university, and a corporate and light-industrial park. The analysis grounded the penetration premium in those specific advantages rather than asserting it.
The demand calculation
Hotel revenue is built from available room nights, occupancy, and rate, and the analysis showed each step so the lender could test the penetration logic.
The math framed the ramp. The subject's fair share of the competitive set on a rooms basis was roughly 17.5 percent, and the analysis modeled the property climbing from below fair share in its first year, as a new hotel builds awareness and channel presence, to above fair share by stabilization in Year 3, with the induced demand from a new flag and its loyalty system supporting the climb. Demand was segmented across commercial, leisure, and group and contract sources, because a hotel underwritten on a single demand type is fragile, and the diversity across the medical center, corporate park, university, and highway was itself part of the credit. The stabilized average daily rate was positioned at a premium to the set, consistent with the newest product carrying the strongest flag.
Building the revenue
The stabilized rooms revenue was built from the ramp and cross-checked.
The two methods of computing rooms revenue reconciled, which is the internal check a credible hotel pro forma shows: occupancy times rate times available rooms, and revenue per available room times available rooms, arrive at the same figure. Ancillary revenue from the breakfast offering, meeting space, and miscellaneous sources added roughly 8 percent, bringing total revenue to approximately $4.46 million at stabilization, consistent with the limited food and beverage profile of a select-service hotel.
The operating pro forma
The analysis flowed revenue through to gross operating profit and net operating income on a uniform-system basis.
The flow-through reflected select-service economics, where a gross operating profit margin in the 40 to 50 percent range is achievable because the limited food and beverage operation carries lower departmental cost than a full-service hotel. The analysis modeled the brand burden explicitly, since the flag carries a royalty, a marketing and program fee, and a loyalty charge that together run near 9 percent of rooms revenue, and it carried a furniture, fixtures, and equipment reserve at 4 percent of revenue, the reinvestment a hotel requires to maintain brand standards. The net operating income reached roughly $1.62 million in Year 3 and approximately $1.78 million at full stabilization in Year 4.
Coverage, debt yield, and the binding constraint
The credit was tested on coverage and debt yield, and the analysis identified the constraint candidly.
This is the finding that distinguishes a rigorous study. At full 85 percent leverage, the project did not clear the debt service coverage floor a hotel lender requires, reaching only about 0.98 times at stabilization and below 1.0 times in the ramp years, with debt yield near 9.5 percent. The analysis did not paper over that; it showed that the deal works when debt is resized to roughly $15 million, raising borrower equity above the 15 percent special-purpose minimum, which brings stabilized coverage to approximately 1.20 times and debt yield to roughly 11.9 percent. A ground-up hotel also runs below 1.0 times coverage during its first two years by nature, which is why the analysis treated a funded interest reserve as essential rather than optional. Identifying the leverage ceiling and the reserve requirement, rather than assuming the maximum loan works, is the core value of the analysis to the lender.
Comparables and valuation
The analysis benchmarked the assumptions and the value against comparables.
At a stabilized net operating income near $1.78 million and a cap rate around 8.5 percent, the going-concern value worked out to roughly $20.9 million, close to total project cost and a candid illustration of the thin development margin in the current rate environment. The analysis noted that the SOP 50 10 8 going-concern appraisal would allocate that value across land, building, furniture and equipment, and the intangible business enterprise value tied to the flag and the assembled operation, the special-purpose separation the program requires.
Returns and risk
The credit was tested on return across a base and downside case, and the risks addressed.
The base case produced a levered internal rate of return in the 13 to 15 percent range over a 10-year hold, sound for a ground-up select-service hotel, while the downside, modeling a 15 percent revenue-per-available-room haircut through the ramp and an exit cap rate expanded to 9.0 percent, compressed the return to 6 to 8 percent. The risks concentrate where the analysis stress-tested them. New supply and penetration risk are foremost, since limited and select-service product dominates the development pipeline, addressed through a penetration ramp grounded in the subject's specific advantages rather than an assumed premium. Lease-up and ramp risk produce the sub-1.0 times early coverage, addressed through the interest reserve. Construction cost and interest-rate exposure are real for a capital-intensive ground-up project, the latter mitigated in part by the long-term fixed-rate 504 debenture. Recurring furniture and brand-renovation reinvestment is a capital risk built into the reserve, and secondary-market demand cyclicality is addressed through the diversified demand base, with environmental and site due diligence handled as separate borrower-obtained scopes.
Conclusion
The engagement reached a conditional affirmative, with the central condition being leverage. The market supported a new hotel, and the subject's penetration premium was grounded in a strong flag, the newest product, and four distinct demand generators rather than asserted, with the revenue built from a segmented demand base and a penetration ramp and cross-checked against the revenue-per-available-room math. The pro forma flowed through to a select-service margin in the expected range, and the analysis identified candidly that the project clears underwriting only at a resized loan with equity above the special-purpose minimum, carried through the ramp by an interest reserve.
The value of the feasibility study was not in declaring a growing Sun Belt market a good place for a hotel, but in deriving the property's penetration from its specific competitive position, in flowing the revenue through to coverage and debt yield the way a hotel lender underwrites, and in showing the lender the leverage ceiling and the reserve requirement that the maximum-loan assumption would have hidden.
Market Data Exhibit — Sun Belt Secondary Metro, 2026
Pro forma figures are representative of this market and program. Industry benchmarks are indicative; verify current occupancy, ADR, RevPAR, cap rates, development costs, franchise terms, and SBA program parameters before citation in a client deliverable.